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COMMENT
BEYOND THE TAKING ISSUE: EMERGING
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ISSUES IN LOCAL
LANDMARK PRESERVATION PROGRAMS
I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 1 upheld a municipality's use of the state's
police power to designate and regulate historic districts and land-
marks. 2 The Court ruled that such action did not effect a "taking"' 3
1. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (landmarks law prohibiting proposed development of air
space over landmark structure Grand Central Terminal in New York City is not a
taking).
2. Id. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City has spawned extensive
commentary on the status of historic preservation law. See Conrad & Merriam,
Compensation in TDR Programs: Grand Central Terminal and the Search for the
Holy Grail, 56 U. DEr. J. U"a. L. 1 (1978); Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand Central
Terminal Decision: A Euclid for Landmarks, Favorable Notice for TDR and A
Resolution of the Regulatory/Taking Impasse, 7 ECOLOGY L. Q. 731 (1978); Samuels,
After Penn Central: A Look Down the Track at Constitutional Taking, 8 REAL EST.
L.J. 230 (1980); Comment, Alas in Wonderland: The Impact of Penn Central v. New
York Upon Historic Preservation Law and Policy, 7 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV. 317
(1978); Comment, Grand Central Terminal and the New York Court of Appeals:
"Pure" Due Process, Reasonable Return, and Betterment Recovery, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 134 (1978); Comment, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York:
Landmark Preservation Eludes the "Taking" Clause, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 317
(1978); Note, Constitutional Law-Historic Preservation by Means of Landmark Des-
ignation: Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978),
30 S.C.L. REV. 825 (1979); Note, Constitutional Law-The Taking Issue-Landmarks
Preservation Law That Severely Restricts the Use of Individual Historic Structures
Does Not Effect a Taking When There Remains a Reasonable Beneficial Use of a
Property-Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), 56 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 141 (1978); Note, Penn Central v. City of New York: A
Landmark Landmark Case, 6 FoRDHAM URB. L. J. 667 (1978); Note, Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York: Landmark Designation, Legitimate Preser-
vation or Unconstitutional Taking?, 25 Loy. L. REV. 205 (1979). These articles either
praise or deride Penn Central Transportation v. New York City as a landmark in
historic preservation law. For a review of pre-Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City case law dealing with municipal preservation programs, see Maher v.
City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905
(1976); Bohannan v. City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d 416, 106 Cal. Rptr. 333
(1973); Rebman v. City of Springfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 430, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969);
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of a landowner's property without just compensation. Although Penn
Central accorded landmark preservation full legal status, 4 it remains a
Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359
N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974). See also Roe v. Kansas ex rel. Smith, 278 U.S. 191 (1929) (upheld
propriety of use of eminent domain power by state government to condemn and take
historic properties); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. By., 160 U.S. 668 (1896)
(upheld propriety of use of eminent domain power by federal government to con-
demn and take historic properties). For a review of pre-Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York scholarly commentary, see Costonis, The Chicago Plan:
Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574
(1972); Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal
Decision, 91 HARv. L. REV. 402 (1977).
3. The fifth amendment provides, "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In terms, the fifth
amendment applies only to the federal government. The fourteenth amendment's
due process clause, however, has been held to impose similar restrictions on the
states. A state (or local government) is required to compensate an owner for taking
private property for a public use. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
239 (1896). The state (or local) government is prohibited from taking private prop-
erty for a nonpublic (or private) purpose, regardless of whether compensation is
paid. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). The problem which arises,
especially in the regulation context, is whether a "taking" actually has occurred. For
a review of Supreme Court cases delineating the parameters of this doctrine, see
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) ("open space" zoning ordinance not a
taking); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding single-family
zoning throughout an entire municipality held not to be an impermissible taking,
despite severe restrictions on the use of property); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954) (allowed governmental appropriation of private property even where prop-
erty was later to be turned over to a private developer based on an expansive reading
of the "public use" concept; recognized "aesthetic" factors as a legitimate exercise of
the police power); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (rejected common
law doctrine that ownership of land extended to the heavens-cuius est solum ejus est
usque ad coelum); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(upheld the constitutionality of use-type zoning regulations); Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (overturned statute which limited mining rights
where no compensation was provided the owner of the estate in land).
4. Landmark preservation law presently shares a status similar to that accorded
zoning as a result of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(upheld the constitutionality of use-type zoning). In the past fifty years, historic
preservation laws, in some form, were enacted in all the states and a substantial
number of municipalities. NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, A GUIDE TO
STATE HISTORIC PRESERVATION PROGRAMS (1976); A NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION, DIRECTORY OF LANDMARK AND HISTORIC COMMISSIONS (1976). Prior to
Penn Central, many of these programs, while "extensive in official recognition," had
"been largely tentative in implementation." Hershman, Critical Legal Issues in
Historic Preservation, 12 URB. LAW. 19, 21 (1980). Since Penn Central, however,
many municipal preservation commissions have taken bold steps towards attaining
the results articulated in their own statements of purpose. In New York City, for
example, "[t]he landmarks commission now regulates more that 15,000 buildings
about 2 percent of the city's housing stock. Some encompass whole areas of the city
such as the Gramercy Park Historic District or the Brooklyn Heights Historic District.
Most recently the commission designated 1,044 buildings as the East Side Historic
District." N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1981, at 56, col. 1. For a digest of local laws possibly
affecting historic preservation, see Kellog, Role of State and Local Laws and Pro-
grams in Historic Preservation, 12 URB. LAW. 31, 40-41 (1980).
LANDMARK PRESERVATION
controversial area of the law because the decision left many questions
unresolved. These include the application of the Court's holding on
the taking issue to other factual situations 5 and the procedural due
process requirements for local designation proceedings.6 This Com-
ment focuses on the issue of procedural due process because current
5. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). A number of prominent scholars have suggested that the
particular location and circumstances of Grand Central Station in New York City are
unusual, and feel that as such the case probably will be distinguished on its facts. See
Marcus, Villard Preserv'd: or, Zoning for Landmarks in the Central Business Dis-
trict, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1977) (suggests that Grand Central Station's status not
only as a superb architectural feat, but as a public utility with nearby properties in
common ownership easily susceptible to transferrable development rights had a great
deal to do with the success of the New York City Landmark Commission in having
this designation upheld). Id. at 12-13. Transferrable development rights, in the
historic preservation context, exist where municipalities grant owners of designated
properties, who by virtue of that designation are unable to fully utilize the airspace
above their parcel, the right to develop a nearby property above the applicable
zoning regulation. See Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preser-
vation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972). ("The Grand Central
decision, according to Mr. Costonis, has been 'overread' and was decided on the facts
of the particular application," N.Y. Times, July 27, 1980, § 8, at 4, col. 4). (Mr.
Costonis is a New York University Law Professor who has published numerous
articles on the many intricacies of landmark preservation law).
Another important issue not dealt with in this Comment is the propriety, in light of
the first amendment's mandate separating church and state, of designating, and
hence restricting, the use of property held by religious organizations. The New York
City provision, NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1976
& Supp. 1981), places different burdens on commercial properties and those held for
charitable purposes. Commercial properties unable to earn a reasonable return have
available to them a real estate tax exemption which can mitigate any harshness
resulting from the law. Charitable and religious organizations, already entitled to a
tax exemption pursuant to N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421 (McKinney 1972),
receive no such reciprocal effect. Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 68 A.D.2d 112,
115, aJJ'd, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980). In order to
overcome the status of landmark designation, the charitable or religious owner must
show that the facility in question no longer suits the physical facility needs of the
organization, not that designation forbids the attainment of a lucrative real estate
sale. See Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121 (1974); Matter of
Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d 933 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd, 29 A.D.2d 376
(1968). This issue is surely to arise in the impending legal struggle over the proposal
by St. Bartholomew's Episcopal Church on Park Avenue in New York City to sell air
rights to its property. Many feel this struggle will evolve into the Penn Central of the
80's. N.Y. Times Oct. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
6. See Bonderman, Constitutional Issues for Preservation Law, 1 LEGAL NOTES
AND VIEWPOINT Q. 109, 110 (May 1981). In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the Supreme Court upheld the use of the police power to
enact historic and landmark preservation laws at the local level against a facial due
process attack. Id. However, because the plaintiff neither judicially reviewed the
original landmark designation, id.at 118, nor availed itself of the opportunity to
supplement the record offered to it by the New York Court of Appeals, 42 N.Y.2d
324, 337, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 922 (1977), a variety of due
process problems remain unanswered.
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interpretations of the taking issue are too narrow to provide adequate
protection to landowners seeking to challenge a landmark designa-
tion.7
In Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland,8 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia set aside as a
violation of procedural due process, a designation of a district as a
National Historic Landmark by the Secretary of the Interior.9  The
court stated:
[The] chief due process argument . . . is that without published
rules of procedure and substantive criteria for qualification as a
landmark, [the affected landowners] have been denied any mean-
ingful opportunity for informal response to the proposed action and
the Court has been precluded from meaningful review of the Secre-
tary's decisions. The Court agrees.' 0
This Comment examines the impact of Historic Green Springs on
judicial attitudes toward municipal landmark preservation proce-
dures. It focuses on the administration of the New York City land-
marks law by the New York City Landmark Preservation Commis-
sion" for two reasons: first, the Supreme Court in Penn Central
7. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) ("open space" ordi-
nance not a taking); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)(landmarks law prohibiting development of a plot containing historic structure is not
a taking); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (zoning
law preventing the filling of wetlands is not a taking). See generally Day, A Land
Retrenchment Policy for Energy and Resource-Short Times: A Modest Proposal, 10
FORDHAM URa. L.J. 71, 77-80 (1981). A number of current news items support the
belief that procedural challenges to the New York City Landmarks Law, NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1976 & Supp. 1981-82), will
increase.
A recent study undertaken by a group appointed by the Committee of Religious
Leaders in the City of New York has charged that the N.Y.C. Landmarks Preserva-
tion Commission frequently designates churches as landmarks regardless of histofic
or architectural merit. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1982, at B3, col. 5, 6. It was pointed out
that literally hundreds of churches and synagogues have been designated landmarks,
and that at least one-third so designated objected to the classification. Id. The study
alleges that the Commission has "willingly accommodated local groups in abusing
the law by employing it for zoning purposes rather than for its lawful purpose of
architectural preservation." Id. The study further points out that "[t]here are no
discernible standards for designating architectural or historic landmarks." Id. For a
similar critique see Richland, The Case for Tightening the Reins on Landmarking,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1982, § 8, at 1, col. 3.
8. 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va. 1980).
9. Id. at 857. The court remanded the case to the Department of the Interior to
develop and promulgate regulations setting out substantive criteria for historic signif-
icance and procedural guidelines for historic landmark designation under the Federal
Historic Sites Act of 1935. Id.
10. Id. at 854.




sanctioned the format of the New York City program; 12 and second,
the New York City Landmark Preservation Commission has been
aggressive in enforcing the New York City landmarks law. 13 The
Comment argues that the procedural safeguards provided by munici-
pal preservation ordinances, such as that found in New York City, are
inadequate in light of the substantial burden landmark designation
can place on a property owner. 14 In conclusion, this Comment rec-
ommends that municipal bodies adopt procedural safeguards which
will protect landowners while ensuring that the public benefit ob-
tained through landmark preservation programs is not jeopardized.
II. Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland
The administrative decision making process in a landmark preser-
vation determination came under close scrutiny in Historic Green
Springs, Inc. v. Bergland.'5  In 1973, the Virginia Historic Land-
marks Commission nominated a 14,000 acre tract of farmland in
Louisa County, Virginia, known as Green Springs (District), 16 to the
National Register of Historic Places (National Register), pursuant to
the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (1966 Act) .17 The
12. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
13. For a discussion of the number of buildings presently regulated by the New
York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, see note 4 supra.
14. For example, under the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, NEW
YoRK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1976 & Supp. 1981-82), a
landowner may not only have to forego a lucrative real estate deal, see, e.g., Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), but is under an
affirmative duty to "keep in good repair (1) all of the exterior portions [of the
building] and (2) all interior portions thereof which, if not so maintained, may cause
or tend to cause the exterior portions ... to deteriorate, decay or become damaged
or otherwise to fall into a state of disrepair." NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A,
§ 207-10.0 (1976 & Supp 1981-82).
15. 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va. 1980). See Note, Administrative Procedure and
Historic Preservation Law: Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 1981 DET. C.L.
REv. 203.
16. An earlier state court decision ruled the designation of the Green Springs
district to be beyond the scope of judicial review. Virginia Historic Landmarks
Comm'n v. Board of Supervisors, 217 Va. 468, 474-76, 230 S.E.2d 449, 452-53
(1976). The state enabling legislation which established the Landmarks Commission,
VA. CODE § 10-138 (1978), conveys mere advisory capacity upon the Commission. As
the Commission had no authorization to promulgate rules and regulations, it was not
an agency requiring judicial review. Virginia Historic Landmarks Commission, 217
Va. at 473-74, 230 S.E.2d at 452.
17. Historic Green Springs, Inc., v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 842 (E.D.Va.
1980). The national register and the applicable provisions of the 1966 Preservation
Act (1966 Act) can be found at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470(a)-470 + (1976). See Exec. Order
No. 11593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1976) (entitled
"Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment"). For a thorough dis-
cussion of the history of the National Register of Historic Place (National Register),
19821
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nomination was approved by the Department of the Interior a few
days later and, in 1974, the Secretary of the Interior designated the
District '8 a National Historic Landmark pursuant to the Historic Sites
Act of 1935 (1935 Act).'"
The controversy arose after Historic Green Springs, Inc., a preser-
vation group, brought suit to enjoin the Farmer's Home Administra-
tion from guaranteeing a loan to the defendant mining company,
Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. (VVL), unless the Farmer's Home Admin-
istration complied with certain protective provisions of the 1966
Act. 20  The loan was to be used to finance mining operations in the
see Fowler, Federal Historic Preservation Law: National Historic Preservation Act,
Executive Order 11593, and Other Recent Developments in Federal Law, 12 WAKE
FOPEST L. REV. 31 (1976).
Properties may be listed in the National Register by one of four methods: (1) acts of
Congress; (2) National Historic Landmark designation by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior; (3) state nomination; or, (4) federal agency nomination of federal property.
National Register of Historic Places, 36 C.F.R. § 60.2(d) (1981). 36 C.F.R. § 60.15(a)
(1981), provides for the following procedures to be taken by a state in nominating an
area to the National Register: (1) survey by the State Historical Preservation Office,
followed by notice to the affected property owners; (2) review by the State Review
Board; (3) nomination by the State Historic Preservation Officer; (4) review of the
nomination by the National Register staff, followed by notice to the affected property
owners; and, (5) final decision by the Keeper of the Register. See generally Note,
Administrative Procedure and Historic Preservation, Law: Historic Green Springs,
Inc. v. Bergland, 1981 DET. C.L. REV. 202.
18. Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp. at 843.
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-469h (1976) (1935 Act). While the Department of the
Interior has promulgated extensive regulations and procedures in the administration
of the 1966 Act, see 36 C.F.R. §§ 60-60.17 (1981) "[t]he 1935 Act is silent concerning
the methods for these exercises of the Secretary's discretion." Historic Green Springs,
Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 851 (E. D. Va. 1980).
20. Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp. at 841. The National Register identifies
areas unique to American history, and culture. The Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to "expand and maintain" the Register pursuant to the 1966 Act, 16
U.S.C. § 470(a)(1) (1976). The legal effect of the Register is provided for in § 470(f),
which requires:
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over
a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the
head of any Federal department or independent agency having authority
to license any undertaking shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure
of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any
license, as the case may be, take into account the effect of the undertaking
on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or
eligible for inclusion in the National Register. The head of any such
Federal agency shall afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such an under-
taking.
Id. The term "undertaking" as used in this Act applies to any federally-assisted
action, thus including the guarantee of the loan to Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. Protec-
tion of Historical and Cultural Properties, 36 C.F.R. § 800. 2(c) (1981). Historic
Green Springs objected to the forwarding of a loan by the Farmer's Home Adminis-
tration unless these criteria were met. Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp. at 842-
43.
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District. VVL counterclaimed and entered a third party complaint,
alleging that there was a notice defect in the nomination of the
District to the National Register. 2' The Secretary of the Interior
conceded that the state nomination was defective due to inadequate
notice to affected landowners. 22 As a result, the entire federal land-
mark process as to the District was void.23 Nevertheless, the Secretary
of the Interior unilaterally redesignated the District a National His-
toric Landmark. 24
While the court addressed numerous constitutional 25 and adminis-
trative law questions 26 raised by the Secretary of the Interior's actions,
it emphasized the importance of ascertaining the requirements of
procedural due process. The court was concerned with due process
21. Id. at 841.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 844. Inter-departmental memoranda indicated that the Department of
the Interior had recognized that the state nomination of the District to the National
Register was defective and as a result, the District had been removed from such a
listing. Id.
24. Id. As to the Secretary of the Interior's authority to grant the District historic
site status pursuant to the 1935 Act, see note 17 supra. Properties designated as
National Historic Landmarks under the 1935 Act are placed automatically on the
National Register. 36 C.F.R. § 60.2(d)(2) (1981).
25. The plaintiffs argued that the Secretary's decisions were arbitrary and capri-
cious and violated plaintiffs' rights under the fifth and tenth amendments to the
United States Constitution. Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp. at 845. The court
considered these in reverse order, first rejecting the tenth amendment argument, id.
at 848, and then proceeding to a detailed consideration of the "taking" argument
under the fifth amendment, id. at 848-50. Recognizing that the landmark designa-
tion subjected the plaintiffs' property to the purview of federal statutes which may
restrict its future uses, id. at 849, the court nevertheless found no present taking, id.
at 850. Although no title changed hands, the landmark status triggered the applica-
tion of several federal statutes which could impede or discourage industrial and
commercial development in the area. Id. at 849. There was testimony that the
Department's activities had had a chilling effect on business and development in that
county. Id. Yet the court, citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978), and Agins v. City of Tiburon 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (where no takings were
found, albeit the impairment of unencumbered land use was substantial and cut
severely into expected profit) found that there remained reasonable beneficial use of
the property. Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp. at 849-50. The district court
specifically found "[t]o date no type of development or industry within the District
has been prohibited." Id. at 850. Given the right case, the court stated it would act,
but on this record, there was no taking. Id.
26. The plaintiff's chief attack on the merits of the Secretary of the Interior's
decision was under the "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion" standard of
§ 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1969, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976)
(APA). Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp. at 845. As to this argument, the court
referred to the absence of a detailed statement of reasons or of clear formal standards
concerning national historic significance but rather than requiring the Secretary to
submit post hoc rationalizations for his decisions, the court remanded the case "for
proper compliance with procedural due process." Id. at 851.
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because the Department of the Interior had no fixed procedures,
published in advance, which would have allowed landowners in the
District to plan their response to the proposed designation. 27 It also
noted that important information relied on by the Department of the
Interior in rendering its decision, "was disclosed, if at all, in piecemeal
fashion often after any opportunity for meaningful response had
passed." 28
The court gave four reasons for rejecting the Secretary of the Interi-
or's contention that two agency publications contained rules of proce-
dure governing the designation process and a list of criteria to be used
in determining national historic significance. 29  First, the criteria
proffered by the Secretary of the Interior bound an advisory board
which could thereafter only recommend action to the Secretary. 30
Second, the procedures contained in the pamphlets specified that
advisory board review would follow a public hearing, but in fact no
such advisory board review was undertaken. 3' Third, the criteria
contained in the agency publications were so vague and open-ended
that there was no limit on the Secretary of the Interior's discretion. 32
Finally, the affected landowners were not informed of the criteria for
determining historic significance contained in the pamphlets until two
months after the public hearing had been held. 33 The court found
that the failure of the Department of the Interior to promulgate or
adhere to published standards for designating the District as a Na-
tional Historic Landmark and listing in the National Register of His-
toric Places was a violation of due process. 34
The determinations of the Department of the Interior were held to
be outside the rulemaking and adjudication provisions of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA) 35 and certain requirements of the Na-
27. Id. at 856.
28. Id. Furthermore, Department of the Interior officials who had made several
"off the record," undisclosed recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior were
not available for "on the record" questioning at the public hearing provided affected
landowners. Id. Finally, the Secretary of the Interior failed to sufficiently detail the
rationale underlying the designation decision itself. Id.




33. Id. "[T]he Department [of the Interior] neglected to make reference to the
pamphlets in any public notice and mentioned the criteria contained therein only in a
September 20, 1977 Federal Register announcement, nearly two months after the
public hearing on the issue." Id. at 852.
34. Id. at 857.
35. Id. at 851. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (Supp. III 1979). Since the court found that
these decisions did not constitute rules under § 551 (4) of the APA, Historic Green
[Vol. X
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tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 36  Instead, the
determinations were characterized as being informal adjudications
defined as "administrative decisions that are not governed by statu-
tory procedures but which nevertheless affect an individual's rights,
obligations, or opportunities. ' 37 As a result, the court attempted to
discern for itself the minimal procedures owed the plaintiffs under the
due process clause of the fifth amendment 38 and certain provisions of
the APA. 39
Springs, 497 F. Supp. at 851, the Department could not fail to follow the requisite
rulemaking procedures under APA, § 553. Id. Nor did the court find the Department
of the Interior governed by the APA's requirements concerning adjudicative proce-
dure, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-57 (Supp. III 1979). The court found that instead, this agency
action, similar to that in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971), fell through the cracks of the APA. Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp.
at 851.
36. Id. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (Supp. III 1979).
The plaintiffs argued that the Department of the Interior erroneously failed to
prepare an environmental impact statement as required under the NEPA for "the
landmark designation, the acceptance of the Green Springs easements, the Depart-
ment's overall plan for the District, and the proposed national easements acceptance
program." Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp. at 851. The court, however, found
"[t]he Department's negative declarations of environmental impact reasonably con-
cluded that environmental impact statements were unnecessary," citing Conserva-
tion Council of N.C. v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.N.C.), aJJ'd, 528 F.2d 250
(4th Cir. 1975). Id. This aspect of the case was criticized as setting questionable
precedent in both environmental and administrative law. Note, Administrative Pro-
cedure and Historic Preservation Law: Historic Green Springs; Inc.. v. Bergland,
1981 DE'r. C. L. REV. 203, 221.
37. Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp. at 852, quoting Verkuil, A Study of
Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 n.1 (1976). In such
instances, "courts must often set the minimal procedural requirements for informal
adjudications." Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp. at 852. The role of the court in
discerning such requirements is not to "require correct or rational decisions," id.,
citing Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 435
U.S. 519 (1978), but "to preserve the integrity of the decision making process." Id.,
citing Barnes Freight Line, Inc. v. ICC, 569 F.2d 912, 923 (5th Cir. 1978). The
procedures and standards followed by the Department of the Interior were found to
be developed on an ad hoc basis as the decision making process went along. Id. at
855.
38. Id. at 852. The due process clause was triggered by the substantial interference
with plaintiffs' property interests, "specifically their right to the use and enjoyment of
their property" caused by designation as a National Historic Landmark (1935 Act)
and being placed on the National Register (1966 Act). Id. at 852. "While the court
found such interference of insufficient magnitude to constitute a taking under the
fifth amendment the Secretary's actions do place substantial restrictions on plaintiff's
property interest so as to require satisfaction of procedural due process." Id.
39. Id. at 855. "In addition to regulations establishing substantive criteria, the
Department is required to promulgate rules of procedure to govern its landmark
designation process. The source of this requirement is shared by the Due Process
Clause and § 552 of the APA." Id. at 855.
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In arriving at these minimum procedural safeguards, two interre-
lated principles used to determine due process rights in the field of
administrative law were applied. The first principle identified was the
familiar "interest-balancing approach" where the importance of a
private interest is weighed against the government's interest in effi-
cient decision making. 40  The court found that while the restrictions
on the use of VVL's property were insufficient to constitute a taking
under the fifth amendment, the restrictions were of sufficient magni-
tude to require satisfaction of procedural due process. 41 The court
specified that a landmark designation process should include the
"preparation of a departmental study report, opportunity for public
comment and public hearing, review by a consulting committee and
Advisory Board, prior to the final decision by the Secretary [of the
Interior] .... 42 The Secretary of the Interior had attempted to
substitute a public hearing for advisory board review, but his actions
in this regard were invalidated. 43
The second principle which the court relied on for its holding is a
relatively new concept which states that, "[jiudicial review [of agency
action] must operate to insure that the administrative process itself
will confine and control the exercise of discretion. Courts should
require administrative officers to articulate the standards and princi-
ples that govern their discretionary decisions in as much detail as
possible."' 44 In Historic Green Springs, the court, after acknowledg-
ing that the imposition of administrative standards 45 was a principle
"still in its fledgling stage,"'40 remanded the controversy to the Depart-
ment of the Interior, requiring that it promulgate both substantive
and procedural standards. 47
III. Procedural Due Process Under the
New York City Landmarks Preservation Law
In 1965, New York City enacted a landmarks law creating the
Landmarks Preservation Commission (Landmarks Commission). 48
40. See notes 83-84 infra and accompanying text.
41. Id. at 852.
42. Id. at 854.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 854, quoting Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckleshaus, 439 F.2d
584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
45. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "administrative standards" is
meant to include both the promulgation of substantive criteria as well as published
rules and procedures.
46. Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 854 (E.D. Va.
1980).
47. Id. at 857.
48. This was accomplished by amendment to the charter and administrative code.
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE. ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1976 & Supp. 1981-
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The primary responsibility of the Landmarks Commission is to pre-
vent the demolition of landmark structures and to police the types of
alterations owners may make to buildings designated as landmarks.
49
In addition, the Landmarks Commission may include entire areas of
the city within historic districts. 50  The New York landmarks law
defines a landmark as:
Any improvement, any part of which is thirty years old or older,
which has a special character or special historical or aesthetic
interest or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural
characteristics of the city, state or nation and which has been
designated as a landmark pursuant to the provisions of this chap-
ter. 51
While the landmarks law expressly provides for the promulgation of
regulations by the Landmarks Commission,5 2 no such regulations have
been adopted to assist in its implementation.
Before the Landmarks Commission may designate a landmark,5 3 or
determine whether to allow a landowner to alter an already desig-
nated landmark structure, 54 a public hearing must be held. 55  The
Landmarks Commission is required to publish notice of such hearings
at least ten days in advance and to give direct notice to all affected
property owners. 56 In addition, where the Landmarks Commission
grants or denies permission to alter an historic structure, it is required
to set forth the reasons for such determination. 57 A number of impor-
82). The creation of the commission was the culmination of increasing concern over
the destruction of such architectural monuments as the old Pennsylvania Station.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1974, at 34, col. 1. The Landmarks Preservation Commission
was created pursuant to N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20, subdiv. (25-A) (McKinney 1968)
(repealed Supp. 1982). This law provided for the control or acquisition of buildings
which have a special character or aesthetic interest or value. The statute enabled the
cities to adopt: "in any such instances such measures [which] if adopted in the
exercise of the police power, shall be reasonable and appropriate to the purpose or if
constituting taking of private property shall provide for due compensation which
may include the limitation or remission of taxes." Id.
49. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-4.0 (1976 & Supp.
1981-82).
50. Id. § 207-2(-a.)(4).
51. Id. § 207-1.0n. This statute is very general compared with some preservation
statutes which describe the external architectural features in considerable detail. See,
e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40c § 5 (Michie/Law. Coop. 1973).
52. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-18.0. (1976).
53. Id. § 207-2.0.
54. Id. § 207-5.0-6.0.
55. The landmarks commission is required to hold a public hearing before a
landmark may be initially designated, id. § 207-2-a, and when determining a request
for a certificate of appropriateness, id. § 207-7.0.
56. Id. § 207-12-a.
57. Id. § 207-14-a; see Matter of Equitable Funding Corp. (Spatt), N.Y.L.J., Feb.
8, 1978, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1978).
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tant considerations qualify these procedural safeguards.The New York
landmarks law expressly provides that the failure by the Landmarks
Commission to give notice of public hearings will not invalidate any
proceedings pursuant to the landmarks law. 58 At the public hearing,
the Landmarks Commission is required to allow a reasonable oppor-
tunity to those desiring to be heard to express themselves, but reserves
the right to consider evidence not presented at the hearing. 59  More
importantly, the landmarks law does not set forth prehearing stand-
ards or provide for cross examination and an express burden of proof.
A landmark designation becomes effective immediately"° and re-
mains in effect until and unless disapproved or modified by the Board
of Estimate"1 within ninety working days of the designation. 62  In
contrast, zoning district regulation changes adopted by the City Plan-
ning Commission to which affected property owners object are subject
to more elaborate procedures6 3 and do not become effective until
approved by a three-fourths vote of the Board of Estimate.6 4  The
58. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-12-a.
59. Id. § 207-12.b.
60. Id. § 207-2e.
61. See Richland, The Case for Tightening the Reins on Landmarking, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 21, 1982, § 8, at 1, col. 3. A former Corporation Counsel of the City of
New York, W. Bernard Richland, has criticized this aspect of the landmark designa-
tion process, specifying that in practice the Board of Estimate is shirking its duty to
oversee the designation process. Mr. Richland points out that "among other things,
the protesting property owner is often limited to a mere three minute statement
before the Board of Estimate." Id. Mr. Richland suggests that the elected members of
the Board of Estimate almost never attend the sessions, leaving that task to minor
functionaries on the staff, and that the Board of Estimate has proven unwilling to
overturn landmark designations due to the "sacred cow" status of the landmarks
commission. Id. Mr. Richland's comments, however, were questioned by Mr. Ralph
C. Menapace, the President of the Municipal Art Society. Mr. Menapace suggests
that the frequency with which the Board of Estimate approves landmark designa-
tions "does not suggest tractability on the part of the Board [of Estimate] but rather
the high standards used by the [landmarks] commission and its strict adherence to the
criteria guiding its selection of landmarks." Menapace, Landmark Authority is
Wisely Applied, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, § 8, at 10, col. 6.
62. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A,§ 207-2-g(2).
63. See note 64 infra and accompanying text.
64. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8, § 200.3 (Supp. 1981). See Richland, The
Casefor Tightening the Reins on Landmarking, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1982, § 8, at 1,
col. 3. Even without such objections, such changes do not become effective until they
are either acted on by the Board of Estimate within sixty days, or the sixty days expire
with no such action. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8, § 200.2 (Supp. 1981).
Furthermore, certain of these zoning changes are subject to the Uniform Land Use
Review Procedure, id. § 197-c-a (Supp. 1981), which involves consideration by the
Community Planning Board as well as by the City Planning Commission, id. § 197-
c.b (Supp. 1981), and the Board of Estimate, id. § 197-a.b (Supp. 1981). As a result,
before a zoning district change, public input is provided for at three levels before
such an amendment will even be voted on by the Board of Estimate. The City
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protection of historic structures from possible destruction may justify
that the landmark designation attach earlier in the overall proceeding
than when zoning changes are made. However, the summary hearing
afforded objecting landowners, provided under the landmarks law,6 5
compares unfavorably with the elaborate procedural framework spec-
ified under the zoning law. 6,
Despite the absence of detailed criteria, procedural formalities,
rules or standards, the statutory framework of the New York City
landmarks program has been upheld, 7 even in the face of specific
challenges that a designated building lacked historic6 8 or aesthetic69
Planning Commission is required, before adopting any zoning resolutions, to hold a
public hearing, id. § 200-a.1. (Supp. 1981). When such resolutions are within the
purview of the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure, the community board involved
is required to hold a public hearing, unless a waiver is permitted by another section
of the Charter, id. § 197-c.c(3) (Supp. 1981). Finally, before the Board of Estimate
approves or disapproves any plan submitted by the City Planning Commission, it
must hold a public hearing. Id. § 197-a.b (Supp. 1981). Additionally, before any
zoning change is adopted by the City Planning Commission, the public notice for the
required hearing must set forth the nature of the proposed amendment and specify a
place at which the entire amendment can be examined. Id. § 200-a.1.
65. See notes 58-62 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 64 supra.
67. See, e.g., Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d
922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42
N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, a3f'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Man-
hattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848
(1966).
68. Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273
N.Y.S.2d 848 (1966). The designation of a home once occupied by Winston Church-
ill's mother was challenged by the landowners as "arbitrary and capricious" because
the premises had no real historical value. Id. at 557, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 850. The
landowner had voiced his opposition to the designation at a public hearing, and also
submitted written objections. Id. at 558, 273 N.Y.S.2d 851. The Landmarks Com-
mission, after discussing the matter at two intervening meetings, designated the
property despite the landowner's objections. Id. The court summarily dismissed this
aspect of the plaintiffs case, stating, "[a] hearing was held and the issues thoroughly
aired. . . . The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
agency." Id. at 559, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
69. In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.104 (1978), without
fully addressing the procedural issues raised, the United States Supreme Court indi-
rectly sanctioned the commission's discretion in designating aesthetically noteworthy
buildings. The Court rejected plaintiff's argument that landmark designation was a
"matter of taste" and thereby "inevitably arbitrary," finding that the right to subse-
quent judicial review, as in zoning cases, would protect against arbitrary determina-
tions. Id. at 132-33. The court stated that the plaintiff's argument had a "particularly
hollow ring" as the plaintiff had not sought judicial review of the designation itself or
denials of the certificate of appropriateness. Id. at 132. It should be noted, however,
that for the court to accept the proposition forwarded by Penn Central-that land-
mark designations are inevitably arbitrary as a matter of taste-would necessitate the
striking of most aesthetic regulations. Had the plaintiffs challenged the original
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merit. Although similar challenges in other jurisdictions have failed 70
a number have been successful.71 Underlying the New York decisions
has been the reluctance of the courts to substitute the judgment of the
judiciary for that of the Landmarks Commission. In the leading case
of Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 72 the New York Court of
designation, or more carefully channelled their argument on this issue, a more
restrained and direct resolution of the issue might have occurred. In the more recent
case, Society of Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 68 A.D.2d 112, 416 N.Y.S.2d 246, alf'd, 51
N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980), the appellate division af-
firmed the Landmarks Commission's designation of the Meeting House for the Soci-
ety of Ethical Culture located on New York's Central Park West. The court granted
broad discretionary powers to the landmarks commission, stating that:
If the preservation of landmarks were limited to only that which has
extraordinary distinction or enjoys popular appeal, much of what is rare
and precious in our architectural and historical heritage would soon disap-
pear. It is the function of the Landmarks Preservation Commission to
ensure the continued existence of those landmarks which lack the wide-
spread appeal to preserve themselves.
Id. at 117, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
70. E.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 905 (1976). Here, the plaintiff challenged the propriety of an ordinance of the
City of New Orleans which regulates the preservation and maintenance of buildings
located within the architecturally distinct historic Vieux Carre district (French Quar-
ter) of that city. The plaintiff challenged the ordinance as both a taking without just
compensation and a violation of due process claiming specifically that the ordinance
provided no objective criteria to guide the commission. Id. at 1053. See Bohannan v.
City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d 416, 106 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1973) (San Diego
historic district ordinance upheld which required construction and alterations to
buildings to use material and styles "in general accord with the appearance of
structures built in Old San Diego prior to 1981." Id. at 423, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 337).
City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964) (Santa
Fe historic district ordinance upheld which regulates window sizes as one detail of
the overall historic style.). See also Young v. Mellon, 93 Cal. App. 3d 1001, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 165 (1979) (refusing to overturn action of state's historic preservation officer for
lack of guidelines in administering the National Historic Program, and stating that
appellant had no liberty or property interest in obtaining a nomination to the
National Register).
71. South of Second Associates v. Town of Georgetown, 196 Colo. 89, 580 P.2d
807 (Colo. 1978); Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (1979); Jarrell v.
Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 481, 128 S.E.2d 879, 883 (1962); Southern Nat'l
Bank of Houston v. City of Austin, 582 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Texas
Antiquities Comm. v. Dallas County College Dist., 554 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1977).
72. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974). The plaintiff, a
religious corporation, succeeded in invalidating the designation of a building which
had formerly been the home of famous financier J.P. Morgan's son. The building had
been used by a religious corporation for its own offices. The corporation wished to
demolish the structure and errect a modern office tower for its use on the site. Id. at
124-25, 316 N.E.2d at 307, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 10-11. The court of appeals declared that
in this instance the "landmark designation" amounted to a void and unconstitutional




Appeals determined that landmark designations clearly are adminis-
trative and not quasi-judicial in nature and, therefore, would be
reviewable under the reasonableness standard, and not the substantial
evidence test. 73 Thus, the New York decisions vest broad discretion in
the Landmarks Commission in its determination of historic or aes-
thetic significance. In few cases have courts questioned the historical
or aesthetic merit of individual properties to which the landmarks law
is applied. 74 Objecting landowners, precluded from meaningful re-
sponse at the administrative level and also subject to the court's sanc-
tion of very broad discretion in the Landmarks Commission, have an
almost insurmountable burden in establishing that the Landmarks
Commission acted arbitrarily in its designation proceeding.
The New York Court of Appeals does, however, continue to express
concern for the landowner's right to meaningfully respond to adminis-
trative action where the economic impact of a land use regulation is at
issue. For example, in Penn Central Transportation v. City of New
York, 75 the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the designation of
Grand Central Terminal as a landmark denied it a reasonable eco-
nomic return on its investment. The court achieved this result, in part,
by excluding from the terminal's investment base, the newly accepted
"social increment" of value accruing to the terminal by virtue of heavy
governmental investment. 76  Judge Breitel acknowledged that "fair-
73. Id. at 128 n.2, 316 N.E.2d at 309 n.2, 35 N.Y.S.2d at 13 n.2. The court stated
that:
Landmark designations are clearly administrative and not quasi-judicial
in nature and as such would be reviewable under CPLR 7803 (subd. 3),
where error of law, arbitrariness or capriciousness or abuse of discretion
(i.e., reasonableness) defines the scope of review. The public hearing
provided for in the Landmarks Law is not the sort of adversary hearing
involving cross-examination and the making of a record as is contemplated
under CPLR 7803 (subd. 4) where the substantial evidence test is set forth.
Id.
74. Matter of Equitable Funding Corp. (Spatt), N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 1978, at 10, col.
2 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1978). The court suggested that the commission "needs to
balance the perpetuation of the historic district against the preservation and enhance-
ment of the neighborhood itself, both of which are essential purposes of the Land-
marks Law as set forth in section 205-1.0.b." Id. Here, the building in question was
vacant and located in a rundown neighborhood. The court felt that development of
the property might enhance the neighborhood without violating the purpose of the
Landmarks Law. Id.
75. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), aJJ'd, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
76. Id. at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278-79, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (1977). The court cited
specifically the railroads and connecting public transportation without which the
court found the terminal property would be worth a fraction of its current economic
value. Id. at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, N.Y.S.2d at 919.
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ness" required that the parties be granted leave in order to meaning-
fully respond to the newly accepted "social increment theory of
value." 77
Similarly, in Spears v. Berle, 7 a decision dealing with the economic
impact of the Freshwater Wetlands Act 79 to an individual property
owner, the New York Court of Appeals remitted the case to the lower
court, directing that a supplementary evidentiary hearing be held.
The purpose of this hearing was to afford the petitioner the opportu-
nity to show how the act effected a taking of his property. 80  The
court found that on the record presented, the commissioner had not
disclosed the full spectrum of permissible uses' for which the property
owner would be allowed to develop his land. The court stated that
unless the landowner was informed of such permissable uses he would
not know "the full spectrum of possible uses to which his evidentiary
proof [should] be addressed. 8 2
IV. Analyzing the Fairness of Local
Landmark Designation Proceedings
In Historic Green Springs, the court found that while the restric-
tions on the use of the private property at issue were insufficient to
constitute a taking under the fifth amendment, the restrictions were of
sufficient magnitude to warrant procedural due process. The court
applied the "interest-balancing" approach and the administrative
standards approach which, together, provide a procedural due proc-
ess framework for evaluating the fairness of local landmark designa-
tion proceedings.
A. The Interest-Balancing Approach
The interest-balancing approach was adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in a series of cases beginning with Goldberg v.
77. Id. at 337, 366 N.E.2d at 278-79, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (1977).
78. 48 N.Y.2d 254, 397, N.E.2d 1304, 422 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1979).
79. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 24-0101 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
80. Id. at 263 n.4, 397 N.E.2d at 1308 n.4, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 640 n.4.
81. The court found that under the Freshwater Wetlands Act, the statute contains
a catalogue of land uses permitted as of right, and also allows the Commissioner to
issue permits for other uses. 48 N.Y.2d at 260, 397 N.E.2d at 1306, 422 N.Y.S.2d at
638. The court specified that in such instances, "[w]hile the property owner should
not . .. be relieved of his heavy burden of proof [on the taking issue], he should be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain notice of the uses, if any, for which the
commissioner would issue a permit." Id. at 263 n.4, 397 N.E.2d at 1308 n.4, 422




Kelly.8 3 Courts utilizing this approach weigh the importance of the
private interest at issue against the government's concern for an effi-
cient decision-making process.
8 4
Most local preservation statutes, including the New York City land-
marks law, provide the procedural requirements which Historic
Green Springs specified as necessary pursuant to the "interest-balanc-
ing" approach. 85 Nevertheless, the procedures set forth in local pres-
83. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits termination proceeding); see also
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975).
84. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Supreme Court
articulated the three pronged interest-balancing test:
[the] identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail.
Id. at 335 (1976). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502-06
(1978); Friendly, Some Kind of Hearings, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975); Mashaw,
The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 28 (1976); Perry, Constitutional "Fairness": Notes on Equal Protection and Due
Process, 63 VA. L. REV. 383 (1977); Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE
L.J. 1227 (1966); Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Respon-
sive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1978); Subrin &
Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARV.
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 449 (1974); Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Proc-
ess-A Plea, for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV. (1974); Tribe, Structural Due
Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 269 (1975); Verkuil, A Study of Informal
Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 (1976); Note, Specifying the
Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balanc-
ing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975).
85. See discussion of the procedures required in Historic Green Springs, Inc. v.
Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va.), at notes 42, 43 supra and accompanying
text. The New York landmarks law provides for notice, a public hearing, a written
description of the factors relied upon by the landmarks commission, and subsequent
approval by the Board of Estimate. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 207-
12-0, 207-14-0 (1976). In the District of Columbia "Historic Landmark and Historic
District Protection Act of 1978" the landmark ordinance also provides for a public
hearing, a written description of the factors relied upon by the Historic Preservation
Review Board and subsequent approval by the Mayor of Washington, D.C. Historic
Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978 §§ 3(e), 8(d), 13, as appearing
in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 77-93. Similiarly, the
Loudoun County, Virginia historic preservation ordinance provides for a public
hearing, a statement of reasons for such approval or denial, and subsequent review
by the Board of Supervisors "Historic Site Districts/Historic and Cultural Conserva-
tion Districts" §§ 750.10, § 750.7, as appearing in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 95-110.
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ervation ordinances are not necessarily sufficient. For instance, under
the New York City landmarks law, the landmark designation hearing
lacks many elements of a fair trial.""
The "interest-balancing" approach in other circumstances has been
used to require procedural formalities which allow an individual to
fashion a more informed response to administrative action than pro-
vided for by the New York City landmarks law.8 7 For example, the
United States Supreme Court, while not prohibiting the use of ex
parte evidence by administrative agencies, has held on due process
grounds that the reliance on such evidence must be disclosed at the
hearing.88 The right to a hearing itself has been held to be meaning-
less where an individual does not know the contrary evidence he must
meet.' Similarly, the right to present evidence is of little value when
an individual does not know what evidence must be presented.90
New York courts have not used "interest-balancing" to require
similar procedures for landmark determinations. Traditionally, the
requirement that a hearing be held and the form of the hearing were
contingent on whether the controversy in question dealt with adjudi-
cative or legislative facts. 9' If the controversy dealt with an adjudica-
tive fact, a comprehensive hearing similar to a full trial was required.
If the determination were more closely aligned to a legislative or
administrative act, something substantially less would suffice.9 2 New
York courts do not require comprehensive hearings perhaps because
the landmark designation process has been characterized as an admin-
istrative, as opposed to a quasi-judicial or adjudicative function. 93
86. See notes 53-62 supra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 88-90 infra and accompanying text.
88. See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938). See also Hot Shoppes, Inc. v.
Clouser, 231 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1964); Allen v. Donavan, 43 Del. Ch. 512, 239
A.2d 227 (1968). Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (Welfare Termina-
tion Proceeding). Accord Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
89. See Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974) (Prison Disciplinary Hear-
ing).
90. CJ. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270 (Welfare Termination Proceeding).
91. Friendly, supra note 84, at 1268. Professor Davis has suggested that legislative
facts answer questions of law, policy or discretion while adjudicative facts concern
the "what, when, and why" of particular situations and can be used to determine
whether a given situation fits within a certain law or rule. Professor Davis contends
that adjudicative facts present the specific questions of truth which render a trial type
hearing valuable. I.K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Treatise § 7.02, at 413 (1958).
See Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971); Kahn, infra
note 94, at 1029.
92. Friendly, supra note 83, at 1268.
93. Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 128 n.2, 316 N.E.2d
305, 309 n.2, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 13 n.2 (1974). For other New York decisions discussing
the legislative adjudicative distinction, see Matter of Kew Gardens Sanitarium v.
Whalen, 55 A.D.2d 226, 228, alf'd, 43 N.Y.2d 675, 371 N.E.2d 827, 401 N.Y.S.2d 65
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The legislative-adjudicative distinction for determining due process
has been criticized in its application to zoning because it fails to take
into account many of the subtle realities of regulating land use. 94
Much of this criticism has equal validity in the historic preservation
context.95  A more suitable approach for both historic preservation
(1977); Matter of Lakeland Water Dist. v. Onondaga County Water Auth., 24
N.Y.2d 400, 407, 248 N.E.2d 855, 301 N.Y.S.2d (1969); Urban Dev. Corp. v.
Vanderlex Merchandise Co., 98 Misc. 2d 264, 273, 413 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1979). For a
discussion of the scope of appellate review of administrative action where such action
is characterized as quasi-legislative, see 1 N.Y. JuR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 178,
185; See also Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Malthie, 270 A.D. 55, 58 N.Y.S.2d 561,
(1945) (Forster, J., dissenting).
94. Kahn, In Accordance with a Constitutional Plan: Procedural Due Process and
Zoning Decisions, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1011, 1028, (1979). The basis for denying
due process to legislative acts has two distinct foundations. First, in Bi-Metallic Inv.
Co. v. Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915), Justice Holmes distinguished
between acts which apply to many citizens and those which only apply to a few. In
terms of due process protections it was reasoned that there would be less opportunity
for corruption where many individuals are concerned and that to provide hearings to
all involved would create a much greater administrative burden. Hence, such acts
were deemed to require little in the way of due process protections. Id. at 1028-29.
Accord Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 167 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). Secondly, courts look to the nature of the decision making
body. Where a legislature is concerned, "[I]f a decision is 'democratically inaccu-
rate,' then the decisionmakers will be removed from office. There is no need for
notice and hearing since the legislature is generally subject to public scrutiny and acts
only upon adequate knowledge and after full consideration." Kahn, supra at 1029,
citing Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 197 (1933); Comment, Due
Process Rights of Participation in Administrative Rulemaking, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
886, 889 (1975). When the deference accorded legislative acts is accorded zoning
agencies, however, these factors seem particularly ill suited to determine the due
process rights of affected landowners. First, zoning changes often involve only a few
landowners and hence the administrative burden in providing beter procedures is not
large. Secondly, where rezoning involves only a few landowners these citizens are
almost powerless to remedy an adverse decision at the polls. Kahn, supra at 1031,
citing Booth, A Realistic Reexamination of Rezoning Procedure: The Complemen-
tary Requirements of Due Process and Judicial Review, 10 GA. L. REV. 753, 778
(1976). While the deference accorded acts of Congress or state legislatures is under-
standable, it is uncertain whether this deference should also be accorded municipal
bodies. Kahn, supra at 1029.
95. In the historic preservation context, the basis of the legislative-adjudicative
distinction also is unsuited for the type of a determination being made under preser-
vation ordinances. See note 94 supra. First, historic preservation, at least in compari-
son to the situation found in welfare, public housing or other social legislation,
presents the government with a relatively finite number of administrative determina-
tions. The government seriously cannot claim a burdensome administrative expense
in the context especially considering that rather than distributing proceeds from the
public treasury, they are attaining a substantial public benefit. Furthermore, af-
fected landowners are particularly ill suited to remedy an adverse decision at the
polls. In many cases, the public benefits in question are priceless but the impact of
non-compensatory regulation on the landowner devastating. It therefore is hard to
imagine that the minority of citizens could muster the support necessary among the
general public to repeal such ordinances when the majority is receiving a tax free
benefit.
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and zoning decisions can be found in a number of recent zoning
decisions."" These decisions hold that the formulation of a compre-
hensive zoning ordinance or any major amendment thereto is legisla-
tive, but where a municipality rezones a small parcel of land, affect-
ing just a few owners, the action is quasi-judicial.9 7 Applying this
reasoning to the preservation context, the initial inventory of historic
buildings or the creation of large historic districts would retain a
legislative character and, hence, require less procedural protection for
affected landowners. However, where a small historic district or indi-
vidual landmark designation was at issue the affected landowners
should be afforded procedural protections more closely patterned on
the judicial model. In North Carolina, for example, reported decisions
have mandated that historic district commission hearings be con-
ducted "in accordance with generally accepted fair trial standards."98
96. Kahn, supra note 94, at 1030, citing e.g., Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of
Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976); Donovan v. Clarke, 222 F. Supp. 632
(D.D.C. 1963); Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1975); O'Meara v.
City of Norwich, 167 Conn. 579, 356 A.2d 906 (1975); City of Louisville v. Mc-
Donald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets,
Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264
Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d
327 (1972).
97. Kahn, supra note 94, at 1030-35.
98. Johnston, Legal Issues of Historic Preservation for Local Government, 17
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 707, 727 (1981). See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of
Alderman, 284 N.C. 458, 470, 202 S.E.2d 129, 137 (1974); Jarrell v. Board of
Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 481, 128 S.E.2d 879, 883 (1962) (quoting Branche v.
Board of Trustees, 141 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (Sup. Ct. 1955). At commission hearings,
property owners may cross-examine witnesses, offer evidence, inspect any documents
and rebut unfavorable evidence. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Alderman,
284 N.C. 458, 470, 202 S.E.2d 129, 137. The commission also may not render a
decision where facts crucial to a determination were the result of unsworn state-
ments. Id. Findings of fact, unsupported by competent, material, and substantial
evidence are similarly invalid. Id. Finally, any ex parte evidence considered by the
commission in reaching a decision must be placed on the record during the course of
the public hearing. Id. at 468, 202 S.E.2d at 136. Commission decisions are review-
able by the board of adjustment and thereafter by a superior court. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160-A 397 (Supp. 1981). Historic commissions are required to present a reviewing
body with a written record. Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 480, 128
S.E.2d 879, 883 (1962). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-37 (1978), which must "state
the basic facts on which it relied with sufficient specificity to inform the parties, as
well as the Court, what induced its decision." Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board
of Alderman, 284 N.C. 458, 471, 202 S.E.2d 129, 138 (1974). The standards of
review rests in the reviewing bodies' finding that facts in evidence reasonably support
the commission's decision. Johnston, Legal Issues of Historic Preservation for Local
Government, 17 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 707, 728 (1981). See In re Pine Hill Cemeter-
ies, 219 N.C. 735, 15 S.E.2d 1 (1941).
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Regardless of whether state courts sufficiently recognize the adjudi-
cative characteristics inherent in the designation of landmarks, there
exist a number of independent considerations which support the impo-
sition of greater procedural safeguards in the landmark process. First,
despite certain unresolved questions which historic preservation
presents,99 land remains at the core of traditional notions of prop-
erty. 00 Second, as a result of the narrow protection provided by the
taking clause under current interpretation,' 0' and the broad definition
of landmark found in preservation statutes, 0 2 wide discretion is being
exercised by landmark commissions. Proceedings before such commis-
sions, therefore, often involve crucial determinations of property
rights. Given these factors, the courts should be particularly careful in
addressing the procedural safeguards due individuals appearing be-
fore landmark commissions.
B. The Administrative Standards Approach
Federal courts, reviewing agency determinations, have attempted
to limit the discretion of administrators by requiring that substantive
and procedural standards be provided affected parties before impor-
99. Professor Costonis has stated that underlying many of the historic preservation
decisions is the broader difficulty of deciding "what the entitlements of private land
ownership should be." Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand
Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARv. L. REV. 402, 408 (1977). Professor Costonis
further points out that legislatures have been reluctant to grapple with the underly-
ing conflicts surrounding historic preservation and other land use legislation. As a
result, courts will be forced to continue to pass upon the "taking" questions raised by
preservation programs without legislative guidelines and decide individual cases
while leaving "untouched the underlying conflicts that make these cases so trouble-
some." Id. at 409.
100. Kahn, supra note 94, at 1038 citing 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 1-2 (3d ed. 1939). See also Philbrich, Changing Conceptions of Property in
Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691 (1938). In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972), the Supreme Court stated that "the property interests protected by proce-
dural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate." Id. at 571-72.
"Thus, ownership of land remains protected under the [Board of Regents v.] Roth
text for entitlements; certainly the law of every state recognized interests in real
property." Kahn, supra note 94, at 1015.
101. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) ("open space"
ordinance not a taking); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978) (landmarks law prohibiting development of a plot containing historic struc-
ture is not a taking); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972)
(zoning law preventing the filling of wetlands is not a taking). See generally Day, A
Land Retrenchment Policy for Energy and Resource-Short Times: A Modest Pro-
posal, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 71, 77-80 (1981).
102. See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
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tant private interests may be infringed upon. 0 3 Perhaps the most
important case in the development of the administrative standards
requirement is Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 104 which
was cited in Historic Green Springs. In Environmental Defense Fund,
the plaintiffs were successful in their efforts to suspend the Secretary
of Agriculture's federal registration of allegedly harmful pesti-
cides.'05 The Secretary of Agriculture had refused to suspend the
registration of a pesticide despite a statute which permitted such
suspension to "prevent an imminent hazard to the public."'' 06 The
court remanded for a new determination requiring that standards be
formulated and that a statement of findings and reasons be provided
showing how the standards were applied.10 7
Professor Davis has suggested that, in light of Environmental De-
fense Fund, courts may substitute the imposition of administrative
standards for the requirement of statutory standards imposed under
the nondelegation doctrine. 10 The nondelegation doctrine, which
prohibited the standardless delegation of legislative power, had been
applied extensively in the zoning context. 09 The nondelegation doc-
103. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:26 (2d ed. 1979). State courts
also have evaluated the exercise of administrative discretion from this viewpoint. See
Herrera v. Jamieson, 124 Ariz. 133, 602 P.2d 514 (1979) (general assistance proceed-
ing); Elizondo v. State Dep't of Revenue, 194 Colo. 113, 570 P.2d 518 (1977) (license
revocation proceeding); Commission on Gen. Educ. v. Union Township School, 410
N.E.2d 1358 (Ind. 1980) (student transfer case); Indiana State Bd. of Health v. B &
H Packing Co., 391 N.E.2d 620 (Ind. 1979) (invalidated Board of Health's arbitrary
reduction of inspection days at meat packing plant); Podgor v. Indiana Univ. 381
N.E.2d 1274 (Ind. 1978) (in-state v. out-of-state tuition status at state university
proceeding); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Norristown Area School
Dist. 473 P. 334, 374 A. 2d 671 (1977) (Human Relations Commission must provide
published guidelines before validly attempting to desegregate schools); Athway v.
State Dep't of Business Regulation, 626 P.2d 965 (Utah 1981) (Utah committee which
licensed psychologists required to adopt published standards as to necessary educa-
tional requirements); Best v. State Dep't of Transp., 99 Wis. 2d 495, 299 N.W.2d 604
(1980) (standards required to validly suspend driver's licenses).
104. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
105. Id. at 596.
106. Id. at 597.
107. Id. at 597-98.
108. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:26, at 130 (2d ed. 1979).
Professor Davis noted that while the United States Supreme Court had never ac-
cepted such a revised non-delegation doctrine the opinions of the only three justices
ever to have referred to it spoke of it with "seeming approval." Id. at 131 citing
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 273, 274 (1971). In Environmental Defense
Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court suggested that a
standards requirement would be "a suitable replacement for the old non-delegation
doctrine." Id. at 598 n.55.
109. Kahn, supra note 94, at 1053. "This doctrine was upheld by the Supreme
Court in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and
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trine is now "virtually dead at the federal level and slowly dying in the
state courts as well."' 10 In its wake, a number of zoning decisions
have required published standards in the determinations of local zon-
ing boards.11 ' Considering the similarities between the power to
designate historic landmarks and the power to zone land, l I2 the con-
tinuing application of the administrative standards requirement in
zoning decisions probably will add impetus to judicial inquiry into the
procedural fairness of preservation ordinances.
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)." Id. at n.233. The doctrine appar-
ently is based upon U.S. CONST. art 1, § I which provides that "[a]ll legislative
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." State court decisions not covered
by this provision of the constitution have phrased the nondelegation principle in due
process terms. Id. at 1054. Furthermore, the doctrine had been used to strike delega-
tions to city legislative or administrative bodies. Id. at 1053-54 citing 1 K. DAvIs,
TREATISE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.09 (1958); 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING §§ 18.08, 19.09 (2d ed. 1976); 5 N. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN
PLANNING LAW § 129.04 (1975); Annot., 58 A.L.R. 2d 1083 (1958).
110. Kahn, supra note 94, at 1054. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
3:14 (2d ed. 1979).
111. Hartnett v. Board of Zoning, 350 F. Supp. 1159 (D.V.I. 1972). Here, a
Virgin Island zoning board's decision was overturned on due process grounds due to
the board's failure to articulate decision-making standards. Id. at 1161. In Metropoli-
tan Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Shell Oil Co., 395 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. App. 1979), the
Indiana court of appeals held that the zoning board, regardless of the expertise it
possessed in land use matters, could not escape the requirement that administrative
decisions be "in accord with previously stated, ascertainable standards." Id. at 1286-
87 quoting Podgor v. Indiana Univ., 381 N.E.2d 1274 (Ind. 1978). In Citizens
against Lewis and Clark Landfill v. Pottawattamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 277
N.W.2d 921 (Iowa 1979), individuals appealed the approval of a conditional use
permit for the operation of a sanitary landfill which was to be located near their
property. In a decision bearing significant parallels to Historic Green Springs, the
court held that the Board's failure to adopt procedural rules invalidated the grant of
the permit, despite the fact that the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act did not
apply. Id. at 923-24. The court found "it difficult to permit other governmental
agencies, even though not covered by the statute [Iowa Administrative Procedure
Act], to operate with no rules and without established procedural guidelines." Id. at
924 (emphasis in original). The court was careful to point out that its inquiry was
concerned with procedural rules only and not substantive standards. Id. at 923.
Having found this issue dispositive of the case, the court found it unnecessary to pass
upon some of the specific objections raised by the plaintiffs; but did hold nonetheless
that future boards of adjustment would be under a duty to make written findings in
such determinations. Id. at 925. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE § 16.95 (2d ed. 1979); E. MCQUILLIN, 8A MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.272 (3d
ed. 1976); E. Sullivan, Araby Revisited: The Evolving Concept of Procedural Due
Process Before Land Use Regulatory Bodies, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 50, 54-57
(1974); Note, Board of Zoning Appeals Procedure-Informality Builds Contempt, 16
SYRACUSE L. REV. 568, 580-81 (1965).
.112. Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(landmarks law prohibiting proposed development of air space over landmark struc-
,ture is not a taking) with Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) ("open" space
zoning ordinance is not a taking). See generally Day, A Land Retrenchment Policy
for Energy and Resource-Short Times: A Modest Proposal, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 72,
77-80 (1981).
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Two decisions also cited in Historic Green Springs support an ad-
ministrative standards requirement based more squarely on due proc-
ess grounds than the Environmental Defense Fund decision." 3  In
Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority,"I4 the New York City
Housing Authority's procedures for admission of tenants to low rent
public housing projects was challenged. The plaintiffs alleged that the
Housing Authority, which processed approximately 90,000 applica-
tions for 10,000 houses, did not process the applications chronologi-
cally or in any other systematic manner.115 Affirming a denial of the
city's motion to dismiss, the court held that in light of the potential for
abuse of uncontrolled agency discretion, "due process requires that
selections among applicants be made in accordance with 'ascertaina-
ble standards.' "116 Similarly, in White v. Roughton,"7 welfare re-
cipients challenged the termination of their benefits under a general
township asistance program. The court found that the administrator's
use of personal unwritten standards for eligibility was violative of due
process and required that he "establish written standards and regula-
tions."" 
8
113. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:26, at 131 (2d ed. 1979).
Professor Davis alludes to four methods under which greater administrative stand-
ards can be required. The first, see notes 104-08 supra and accompanying text, is
based on replacing the non-delegation doctrine. The second, embraced by Holmes v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) and White v. Roughton,
530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976), is based on the fact that "in some circumstances the
lack of rules or standards is so unreasonable that due process is denied." K. DAVIS,
ADMiNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:26, at 131 (2d ed. 1979). The third is analagous to
the "void for vagueness" doctrine in the criminal law, and the fourth has for its basis
"evolving common law or equitable considerations, based on judicial understanding
of fairness and propriety." Id.
114. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
115. Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 264 (2d Cir. 1968).
The plaintiffs also complained that applications expired automatically at the end of
two years and that many applications were never considered at all. A further allega-
tion was that determinations of uneligibility were not reported to the applicants
(except where excessive income was the grounds for ineligibility) and that decisions
were unsupported by reasons. Id.
116. Id. at 265, citing Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1964).
117. 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976).
118. Id. at 754. The court found that the program administrator, not bound by
any eligibility requirements other than those found in the state general assistance
statute, was still required "to administer the program to ensure the fair and consist-
ent application of eligibility requirements. Id. at 753-54. See also Silva v. Secretary
of Labor, 518 F.2d 301, 311 (1st Cir. 1975); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power
Comm'n., 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 168
(7th Cir. 1969); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976);
Smith v. Ladner, 288 F. Supp. 66, 70-71 (S.D. Miss. 1968).
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Requiring landmarks commissions, particularly those patterned af-
ter the New York City landmarks program,"" to control discretion
through substantive and procedural safeguards is a due process ap-
proach well suited to meet the valid claims of objecting landowners to
fair procedures. As one federal district court for the Virgin Islands
recognized in an analgous decision
The problems are . . . apparent when one's ability to get approval
from a board ... cannot be predicted because no hint is ever given
either prior to or after application as to when the board will give
such approval and when it will withhold it. The problem is basi-
cally one inimical to ad hoc, standardless decisions. . . . [A]gency
attempts to control any form of behavior should be governed by
standards for decision which are stated in advance and given wide
circulation .... For due process reasons, these standards should be
publicly promulgated and written precisely enough to give fair
warning as to what the standards for decision will be.' 20
A number of jurisdictions have required administrative standards
where landmark preservation ordinances were at issue. 121 A 1979
decision by the Texas Civil Court of Appeals 122 overturned a portion
of the City of Austin's preservation ordinance, as applied to a down-
town hotel, finding it a standardless delegation of legislative author-
ity.123 The Austin ordinance provided that any chairman, vice-chair-
man, or executive secretary of the Austin Landmark Commission
could, in his individual capacity, place property on the landmark
commission agenda. 124 The court found that the application of the
Austin ordinance unlawfully vested ultimate legislative authority in
the members of the landmark commission in their individual capac-
ity. 125
119. See notes 48-60 supra and accompanying text.
120. Hartnett v. Board of Zoning Subdivision & Bldg. Appeals, 350 F. Supp.
1159, 1161 (D.V.I. 1972).
121. See note 71 supra.
122. Southern Nat'l Bank of Houston v. City of Austin, 582 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979).
123. Id. at 238-39.
124. Id. at 233. The ordinance further provided that once a property was placed
on the Landmark Commission's agenda, that full gamut of preservation protections
would apply. Id. at 237-38.
125. Id. The court also addressed the issue of whether appropriate standards
guided individual commission members. The court, citing Texas Antiquities Comm.
v. Dallas Community College Dist., 554 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1977), found the Austin
Ordinance to be in "power over property of landowners . . . which must be har-
nessed by appropriate standards and guidelines." Southern Nat'l Bank of Houston v.
City of Austin, 582 S.W.2d 229, 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). The court also found the
ordinance defective in its complete lack of standards. Id.
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Similarly, a 1977 decision by the Texas Supreme Court found the
Texas Antiquities Code unconstitutionally vague and without stand-
ards to guide those empowered with its administration. 2  The court
concurred with Professor Davis' view that in the absence of statutory
standards, published rules or regulations would suffice.127 Having
found neither statutory standards nor administrative rules or regula-
tions, the court was constrained to hold the statute void. 128  The
Texas legislature has since amended the applicable provisions of its
Antiquities Code 129 and added more specific criteria for the identifica-
tion of landmarks.
In a Colorado decision specifically involving an historic district
ordinance, 130 the court found the ordinance at issue to be void for
vagueness.' 31 The court, while rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that the
language of the ordinance was overly broad, 3 2 held the ordinance
126. Texas Antiquities Comm. v. Dallas Community College Dist., 554 S.W. 2d
924, 927-28 (Tex. 1977). The court reviewing the language of the Texas ordinance
stated:
There has been called to our attention no case in Texas or elsewhere in
which the powers of a state board are more vaguely expressed or less
predictable than those permitted by the phrase in question. The word
"building" comprehends all structures; "historical" includes all of the past;
"interest" ranges broadly from public to private concerns and embraces
fads and ephemeral fascinations. All unrestorable structures ordinarily
hold some nostalgic tug upon someone and may all qualify as "buildings
... of historical .... interest.
Id. at 927. The court expressly refused to discard the non-delegation doctrine, stating
that "[s]ound reasons support the rule that some reasonable standard is essential to
the constitutionality of statutory delegation of powers to state boards and commis-
sions." Id.
127. Id. at 928.
128. Id.
129. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 191-92 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1981).
130. South of Second Assocs. v. Georgetown, 196 Colo. 89, 580 P.2d 807 (Colo.
1978).
131. Id. at 93, 580 P.2d at 811. Here, the Georgetown, Colorado, Board of
Selectment had amended the existing zoning law by including the entire municipal
limits of Georgetown within a preservation district. Id. at 90, 580 P.2d at 808.
"Georgetown is a municipal corporation created by the Colorado territorial legisla-
ture in 1868. The town and surrounding area are rich in the culture and history of
early Colorado." Id. The plaintiffs, owners of undeveloped real property within the
municipal limits, challenged the denial of a requested "certificate of appropriate-
ness" which would have allowed them to construct townhouses on their vacant land.
Id. at 91, 580 P.2d at 809.
132. Id. at 93, 580 P.2d at 810. The court based its finding that the language in
the ordinance was sufficiently definite on what it termed a "consensus of those courts
which have considered similar provisions .. " Id. citing Figarsky v. Historic Dist.
Comm'n of the City of Norwich, 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d 163 (1976); Trustees of
Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dep't 1968);
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void for failing to specify which areas within the historic district were
entitled to preservation. The ordinance had the effect of vesting "un-
reviewable discretion in the Commission," 133 because a landowner
could not "reasonably ascertain which architectural designs would
entitle him to a certificate of appropriateness."1 34
While administrative standards often have been required by the
judiciary, they may be set forth in enabling state legislation as well. In
North Carolina, for example, the state enabling legislation requires
local preservation commissions to promulgate and adopt rules of pro-
cedure before they may take action infringing on property rights. 135
V. Conclusion
The procedural safeguards provided under landmark preservation
programs, similar in format to that found in New York City, are
inadequate in light of the substantial burden landmark designation
can place on a landowner. Given the narrow judicial interpretation of
the taking issue, it is increasingly important for landowners to be
afforded the opportunity to challenge such designations at the admin-
istrative level. In those jurisdictions which have required greater pro-
cedural safeguards, the valid goals of landmark preservation have not
been compromised. 36  For these reasons, landmark preservation
commissions should be required to promulgate substantive standards
for determining landmark significance and to adopt detailed rules of
procedure to govern the designation process.
Samuel A. Turvey
Town of Deering v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481, 202 A.2d 232 (1964); City of Santa Fe v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964); Opinion of the Justices to
the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557) (1955). The court stated that, "[m]ost
municipalities which have established similar historical preservation districts ...
specifically delineate those areas which possess such a unique character as to be
entitled to preservation." South of Second Assocs. v. Georgetown, 196 Colo. 89, 94,
580 P.2d 807, 811 (1978). The landmark commissioners could not arrive at any
consensus in their testimony on the boundaries or areas within the district and hence,
no published boundaries were part of the public record. Id.
133. Id. at 94-95, 580 P.2d at 811.
134. Id.
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-397 (Supp. 1981).
136. For example, North Carolina, which requires comprehensive procedural
safeguards, also has one of the more active preservation programs in the country. See
Johnston, note 98 supra.
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